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Abstract 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States’ 
emergency response capability, while robust, was disorganized in that organizations were 
not prepared or equipped to coordinate response actions across multiple agencies at a 
national level.  This research investigates whether NIMS and the AFIMS structure is 
optimal for Air Force emergency managers, or whether, while maintaining NIMS 
compliance, there is a more effective way for the Air Force to organize its emergency 
management and response forces.  Specifically this research focuses on the organization 
of the EOC and investigates whether shifting from the current structure of the ESFs to the 
FLOP structure found in the ICS may be a more efficient use of personnel based on the 
organizational requirements of the Air Force. This research will employ DSMs to 
independently evaluate the merits of both the ESF and FLOP construct for specific 
scenarios based on the tasks outlined in the Air Force’s CEMP 10-2.  For seven of the 
eight scenarios examined, ESFs are reaching less than 60% capacity, in fact, most only 
reach 30% capacity or below.  On the other hand, FLOP capacity is significantly 
increased, however, in some of the more demanding scenarios, capacities exceed more 
than 100%. 
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 1 
AN EVALUATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AIR 
FORCE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS USING SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN STRUCTURE MATRICES 
I. Introduction 
Introduction 
Emergency response was forever changed in the United States following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  In an attempt to improve the United States’s 
organizational interoperability during major disasters, the nation developed a new 
emergency response doctrine to be implemented at all levels, including local, county, 
state and federal agencies.  As a federal agency, the Department of Defense (DoD) was 
required to implement the change to ensure military responders could easily integrate 
with local responders when necessary.  This thesis researches the Air Force’s 
implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), specifically as it 
applies to the Air Force’s Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), investigating 
effectiveness of the current emergency operations center structures.  This chapter outlines 
the background, objectives and justification for the research and briefly describes the 
research methodology, closing with a preview of the remaining chapters. 
Background  
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States’ 
emergency response capability, while robust, was disorganized in that organizations were 
not prepared or equipped to coordinate response actions across multiple agencies at a 
national level.  Eleven days after the attacks President Bush announced the creation of the 
Office of Homeland Security by executive order to develop and implement a national 
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strategy to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks.  The official announcement from 
the President’s office stated: 
The mission of the Office will be to develop and coordinate the implementation of 
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks.  The Office will coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to 
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks within the United States. (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001) 
On 25 November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
officially created with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which 
recognized the new cabinet level position in the White House and moved 22 agencies 
related to homeland security within the new department (DHS, 2012).  Shortly after the 
Department’s creation, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-5 which ordered DHS to develop and administer a National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) which would be adopted by all federal agencies including 
those within the Department of Defense (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003). 
In response to the President’s directive, the Air Force developed the Air Force 
Incident Management System (AFIMS) as a means of implementing NIMS within the 
unique framework of the United States Air Force.  AFIMS is defined by Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, the governing regulation on Air Force Emergency 
Management as:   
A methodology designed to incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS, 
the NRP and OSD guidance while preserving the unique military requirements of 
the expeditionary Air Force.  AFIMS provides the Air Force with an incident 
management system that is consistent with the single, comprehensive approach to 
domestic incident management.  AFIMS provides the Air Force with the 
coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate its specific 
authorities into the collective framework of Federal departments and agencies for 
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action to include mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
activities.  (USAF, 2007) 
A broad overview of the organizational structure of AFIMS can be seen in Figure 
1 below.  At the strategic level is the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and is chaired by the 
Wing Commander and manned with the wing staff and group commanders.  The 
objective of the CAT is to evaluate the overall strategic objectives of the base and the 
current emergency.  For example, is the base capable of continuing its primary mission 
and function while this emergency is ongoing?  Does the base have the necessary 
resources to respond to the emergency?  What needs to be reported to higher-
headquarters?  At the tactical level is the incident command staff.  The incident command 
staff is lead by the incident commander and is organized by four major functions into the 
Finance, Logistics, Operations, and Plans (FLOP) organizational structure.  The Incident 
Command System (ICS) is designed to be extremely flexible and expandable to meet the 
needs of the current situation.  The incident command staff, are the personnel responsible 
for expending the resources at the scene to achieve the tactical objectives of the 
emergency response.  Finally the EOC operates as the hub of the emergency response and 
recovery.  The primary role of the EOC is information and resource gathering and 
disseminating.  The EOC is responsible for providing the resources necessary to the 
Incident Commander for use in response to the emergency.  The EOC also develops a 
common operating picture by attempting to consolidate the information gathered by the 
personnel in the EOC.  The EOC is organized by the Emergency Support Function (ESF) 
structure.  The ESF structure is a standardized 15 organization structure grouping 
“federal resources and capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed 
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in a national response” (FEMA, 2008).  Finally, during emergencies, individual Unit 
Control Centers (UCCs) stand up, as a means to supporting the response.  Typically, the 
UCCs provide information or resources as required through communication from the 
EOC.  Currently there is no defined staffing or organizational structure for the UCC, each 
unit is responsible for adequately staffing the UCCs as required.  
 
Figure 1 - AFIMS Organizational Structure 
The National Response Framework (NRF) builds upon NIMS and “provides the 
structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident 
management” (FEMA, 2008).  The NRF stipulates that “EOCs may be organized by 
major discipline... by jurisdiction… by Emergency Support Function… or more likely by 
some combination thereof,” indicating the flexibility offered within NIMS and the NRF 
to allow agencies to structure themselves in a method they deem optimal while still 
maintaining federal compliance (FEMA, 2008).  The overwhelming majority of local and 
state EOCs are organized under the ESF construct.  Because of the local and state EOC 
organization, and a lack of available research into alternatives, the Air Force chose to 
adopt the ESF construct as well. 
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The ESF structure was initially developed for use in the National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC) “to achieve an effective national response to any incident 
that occurs” (FEMA, 2008).  National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) has 
developed and standardized 15 ESFs as a “mechanism to coordinate functional 
capabilities and resources provided by… departments and agencies” (FEMA, 2008).  
However, the ESF construct became the primary method of organization because it easily 
aligned the primary functions of a local municipality in a standardized method in an 
attempt to simplify emergency response.  Table 1 - Emergency Support Functions and 
Air Force Equivalent Units (United States Air Force, 2009) lists the ESFs, their basic 
responsibilities and the equivalent Air Force unit responsible to fill those roles.  
While this method is efficient at the municipal and state level, the ESF method 
does not take into account the Air Force’s unique organization.  Many Air Force subject 
matter experts in the Emergency Management career field confirmed that the mismatch 
between the Air Force’s organization and the ESF structure causes inefficiencies 
(Messina, 2012). First, there is a significant level of redundancy, while 15 separate 
organizations are designed to staff each ESF, based on the current construct, the Civil 
Engineer Squadron maintains primary responsibility on seven ESFs, and the Logistics 
Readiness Squadron and Medical Group holds primary responsibility for two ESFs.  
Additionally, ESF #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services, 
are Force Support Squadron functions, except for Housing which again falls to the Civil 
Engineer Squadron, thus further blurring the distinctions found within the ESF construct 
(United States Air Force, 2009).  Moreover, the ESFs do not take into account a number 
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of Air Force functions critical to emergency response, including Finance, Contracting, 
Airfield Operations, Aircraft Maintenance, Chaplaincy, Wing Safety, Bio-Environmental 
Engineering, and Judge Advocate Generals. Table 1 below lists the 15 ESFs and Air 
Force equivalent units. 
Table 1 - Emergency Support Functions and Air Force Equivalent Units (United 
States Air Force, 2009) 
ESF Responsibility Air Force Equivalent 
ESF #1 Transportation Logistics Readiness 
Squadron 
ESF #2 Communications Communications Squadron 
ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #4 Firefighting Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #5 Emergency Management Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 
Housing, and Human Services 
Force Support Squadron 
ESF #7 Logistics Management and Resources 
Support 
Logistics Readiness 
Squadron 
ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services Medical Group 
ESF #9 Search and Rescue Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources Medical Group 
ESF #12 Energy Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #13 Public Safety and Security Security Forces Squadron 
ESF #14 Long Term Recovery Civil Engineer Squadron 
ESF #15 External Affairs Public Affairs 
However, another method of organization is available to the Air Force.  The 
Incident Command Staff (ICS) on scene is organized via the FLOP structure.  Mirroring 
that structure at the EOC has the potential to widen the lines of communication between 
the ICS and the EOC, from just the Incident Commander (IC) and the EOC Director to 
each primary member of the FLOP staffs.  Additionally, it allows for greater flexibility 
within the EOC by allowing each FLOP functional leader to augment his or her staff with 
the appropriate units to specifically tailor the response to the emergency at hand.  This 
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research will attempt to compare the two organizational structures, and attempt to 
identify which is better tailored to meet the needs of Air Force Emergency responders. 
Research Problem 
This research investigates whether NIMS and the AFIMS structure is optimal for 
Air Force emergency managers and responders in its current form, or whether, while 
maintaining NIMS compliance, there is a more effective way for the Air Force to 
organize its emergency management and response forces.  Specifically this thesis focuses 
on the organization of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and investigates whether 
shifting from the current structure of the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to the 
FLOP structure found in the ICS may be a more efficient use of personnel based on the 
organizational requirements of the Air Force. 
Research Objectives 
In order to determine which organizational structure provides the most effective 
capability for response and recovery, an analysis of individual personnel capacity should 
be conducted for each individual in the EOC.  Capacity in this context is “the capability 
to complete tasks and usually refers to the volume of resources available for task 
realization” (Horman, 2001).  By evaluating individual capacities, a quantitative analysis 
can be accomplished to determine individual workloads of personnel in the EOC to 
conduct direct comparisons between the two organizational structures.   
 8 
Research Approach 
In order to calculate individual capacities, and given the fact that each emergency 
scenario is inherently unique; a comprehensive list of tasks along with who is responsible 
for them is required.  In attempt to develop a comprehensive list of tasks, the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2 (CEMP 10-2) was used.  According 
to Air Force Instruction 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning 
and Operations, the CEMP 10-2 “provides comprehensive guidance for emergency 
response to physical threats resulting from major accidents, natural disasters, 
conventional attacks, terrorist attack and CBRN attacks” (United States Air Force, 2009).  
To accomplish this research a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) methodology was used.  
Design structure matrices (DSMs) can take the tasks and responsibilities, and develop a 
response timeline in the form of a Gantt chart that can be used to determine the total 
response duration, and individual personnel durations to determine individual capacities 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  DSM analysis will simulate the estimated time to 
complete the tasks outlined in the CEMP 10-2, and determine the capacity of each EOC 
position.  This information can then be used to develop an optimal organizational 
structure based on actual response requirements for specific emergency scenarios. 
Scope, Assumptions and Limitations 
This study focuses solely on the organizational design of the Air Force Incident 
Management System and Air Force EOCs.  Those organizations outside the USAF 
should evaluate the usefulness of this research towards their own organizations carefully 
as its applicability may vary.  While the facts and figures are specifically tailored for Air 
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Force Emergency Management, it is likely that others may find the methodology 
beneficial for their own organizations.  However, application of these results towards 
other organizations may require further research prior to implementation outside of the 
United States Air Force. 
Some assumptions were required in order to accomplish this research.  First, 
while the CEMP 10-2 calls itself a comprehensive plan, it is impossible for it to be truly 
comprehensive as each emergency has an infinite number of unknowns that cannot 
otherwise be planned for.  As such, the CEMP 10-2 is “comprehensive” in the sense that 
it includes all the tasks that are universally common for each emergency scenario.  
Therefore the checklists of the CEMP 10-2 offer the maximum level of detail available 
for planning purposes, thus providing the data required for the DSM analysis.  
Furthermore, the CEMP 10-2 has approximately 28 standard emergency checklists, 
spanning four incident types.  In attempt to narrow the scope, only eight checklists were 
chosen in only two most common incident types, major accidents, and natural disasters.  
The eight scenarios were chosen based on their dissimilarities in consequence/impact and 
complexity to evaluate a wide range of scenario types without being required to analyze 
every single scenario. Additionally, task duration estimates were required to conduct the 
DSM analysis.  Because task duration estimate data are not readily available, an 
assumption was made that the task durations for each task was approximately the same.  
This assumption is considered valid because typically the role of the EOC is to gather and 
disseminate information to those actually accomplishing the tasks, rather than 
accomplishing the tasks themselves.  Because the role is to primarily gather and 
disseminate information, it is valid to assume that this takes approximately the same 
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amount of time regardless of the task, in comparison to the duration times required to 
actually accomplish the task. 
Furthermore, some limitations arose from the DSM model used for the 
simulation.  Due to the way the simulation model is written, the maximum duration is 
limted to 256 time-step intervals, (the maximum number of columns in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet).  Because of the complexity of the scenarios that were researched, and that 
they have a relatively long duration, a five-minute time-step duration was used as a 
means to overcome this limitation.  While using a five-minute time-step duration slightly 
lowers overall simulation fidelity as compared to a one-minute time-step duration, it was 
necessary to ensure the results stayed within the 256 time-step maximum.  Finally, a 
fundamental assumption of the DSM model is that completion times are identical for both 
the ESF and FLOP organizational constructs because the Gantt chart is based on the 
required checklist tasks, and are accomplished in the same order regardless of who 
accomplishes them.   
 Preview 
The remaining chapters focus on presenting additional detail related to the 
problem statement, proposed solutions and results.  Chapter II provides a review of past 
research into Emergency Management and the implementation of NIMS, a foundation in 
Network Analysis and Design Structure Matrices setting the framework for the 
organizational design of the EOC.  Chapter III outlines the method for evaluating the 
current EOC structure against different alternatives.  Specifically, it explains the use of 
DSMs, and how individual capacities are calculated for each individual EOC personnel.  
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Results will be presented in Chapter IV, and includes the average process duration times, 
average capacities for both the ESF and FLOP constructs, and a visual comparison of the 
two constructs based on the eight scenarios evaluated.  Finally Chapter V offers a 
conclusion and recommendation for the organizational structure of the EOC, and 
provides a decision support tool for EOC Directors to optimally staff the EOC based on 
the given emergency.   
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
While little research has been accomplished on AFIMS itself, many scholars have 
researched the effectiveness of current emergency management doctrine and policy, to 
include NIMS and the NRF.  This chapter will review the literature including a 
background of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Design Structure Matrices (DSM) 
and their link to emergency management and EOC organization.  Specifically, this 
chapter will investigate research by A. Dekker (2002) on Force, Intelligence Networking 
and Command and Control (C2) (FINC) and the role organizational structure plays in 
military unit effectiveness through use of SNA.  Robert Houghton, et al. (2006) expanded 
upon Dekker’s (2002) research by examining the ICS of United Kingdom (UK) police 
and fire response and evaluating them through Dekker’s SNA C2 architecture 
methodologies.  Finally, Maj. Joseph Legradi took the results of Dekker (2002) and 
Houghton, et al. (2006) and applied the research specifically to military and civilian 
EOCs.  Legradi concluded that significant differences existed between how military and 
civilian EOCs operate despite the similar organizational structure, and recommended 
further research on whether military EOCs could be better organized to suit the specific 
needs of military emergency response.  This literature review investigates this line of 
research and sets the framework for the introduction of DSMs to evaluate EOC 
organizational structure. 
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Network Theory and Social Network Analysis 
Network theory has a broad range of applications in areas of biology, computer 
science, economics, operations research, particle physics, statistical physics, and 
sociology.  Specifically, the use of network theory in sociology has grown since the mid-
1930s, and has now become a standard methodology of research to understand and map 
the interactions of people in a number of environments from office and family culture to 
international diplomacy and politics.  With the rise in the popularity of research on 
emergency management (EM) in the decade following the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, it was only a matter of time before SNA would be used to investigate the 
internal and external networks found in many of the EM fields.  Articles by Dekker 
(2002), Houghton, et al. (2006), and Legradi (2009) set a framework for the discussion 
and appropriateness of use of SNA in military and EM organizations.  However, it is 
important to first develop a basic foundation in SNA itself, its history and its application. 
Social Network Analysis can trace its roots to three distinct academic disciplines: 
psychology, anthropology, and sociology (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. vii).   Psychologist 
Jacob Moreno, the founder of the journal Sociometry, developed and first used the 
methodology in 1937 by measuring the strength of social relations to “better study the 
relationship between social structures and psychological well-being” (Knoke & Yang, 
2008, p. vii).  However, the most famous early social network analysts are psychologist 
Elton Mayo and anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner whose studies of the Hawthorne Plant 
of the Western Electric Company in Chicago Illinois in the mid-1930s set the standard for 
future research within the field.  Their use of SNA developed the foundation for what has 
since been described as the Hawthorne Effect, or the principle that a research 
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participant’s behavior may be “related only to the special social situation and social 
treatment they received” (French, 1950, p. 82).  However, SNA as a scientific method did 
not truly gain popularity until the 1970s, and has continued to grow exponentially since 
then.  Only a handful of published journal articles used the term “social network” in their 
abstract in 1970 but more than 2500 articles included the term in 2005 (Knoke & Yang, 
2008, p. 1).   
According to Knoke and Yang, there are three basic underlying assumptions to 
SNA. The first assumption is that “structural relations are often more important for 
understanding observed behaviors than are such attributes as age, gender, value, and 
ideology” (2008, p. 4).  In other words, it is the relationship between the two actors that is 
significant, not the unique characteristics of the individuals.  A good example is the 
student-teacher relationship, or the relationship between coworkers.  There is an 
expectation of behavior of both actors that is unique to the relationship, but those same 
individuals may act differently when placed in another contextual scenario.  The 
difference isn’t heavily influenced by the attributes of the individuals, but instead the 
social context of the relationship itself. 
The second assumption Knoke and Yang introduce is that “social networks affect 
perceptions, beliefs, and actions through a variety of structural mechanisms that are 
socially constructed by relations among entities” (2008, p. 5).  This assumption has been 
popularized through the common saying that “it isn’t what you know, but who you 
know.”  Individual relationships within the social network affect the flow of information 
and the capabilities of the organization significantly.  It is not uncommon to observe that 
information often flows fastest through informal networks and cliques rather than through 
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more official chains of communication.  Understanding and exploiting those informal 
networks within an organization can lead to increased productivity and office 
capabilities; however, they can also “reinforce prejudices and fan conflicts with out-
groups” making it important to properly manage and mitigate potential issues derived 
from informal networks (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 5). 
Finally, the third assumption is that “structural relations should be viewed as 
dynamic processes” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 6).  That is to say change should be 
expected because humans are involved.  If one person is underperforming due to illness, 
or a relationship is strained due to personal differences between the individuals, the entire 
social network can be affected.  Additionally, the social network is inherently affected 
when people are introduced to or removed from the network.  The new network must re-
adjust to accommodate these changes which can significantly disrupt the workflow until 
the network can rebalance itself. 
A key to understanding and researching social networks came with the 
introduction of the sociogram.  A sociogram, as seen in Figure 2 below, is a series of 
nodes which represent individuals within a social network and lines which indicate the 
relations between the individuals.  To take expand upon the sociogram, weightings and 
directional vectors can be applied to relation lines allowing for further mathematical 
analysis and interpretation.  A foundation for this analysis was introduced via graph 
theory by Dorwin Cartwright in 1956, by broadening Heider’s theory of balance from the 
mathematical series of linear graphs to “configurations of many different sorts, such as 
communication networks, power systems, sociometric structures” and much more 
(Cartwright, 1956).  Cartwright’s generalization also expanded Heider’s theory from the 
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typical linear “x” and “y” graph to a more general collection of “axioms and formulas 
used to analyze the points and lines” (Legradi, 2009, p. 15).  
Emergency Management and Social Network Analysis Research 
Dekker (2002) recognized that there are four primary goals, or outputs, of SNA.  
The first goal is to “visualize communication and other relationships between people 
and/or groups by means of diagrams” (2002, p. 2). Secondly, SNA creates a capability to 
study factors that influence and correlations between relationships (Dekker, 2002, p. 2).  
The third goal Dekker identifies is the ability to “draw out implications of the relational 
data” to identify the shortcomings and “bottlenecks” found within the network (2002, p. 
2).   Finally, and most importantly, according to Dekker, is the goal to develop 
recommendations based on the SNA to improve communication, “and (in military terms) 
to speed up the orient-observe-decide-act (OODA) loop or decision cycle” (2002, p. 2). 
Figure 2- Sociogram 
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With those goals in mind, Dekker developed four primary archetypes of command 
and control (C2) based on SNA.  These archetypes, summarized by Legradi (2009) can 
be seen in Table 2 below.  To help illustrate the archetypes, Dekker identified actual 
military units that are organized under a similar C2 architecture.  The four types include 
Centralized C2, used by Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft who 
gather intelligence from multiple sources to control and prioritize targets for strike 
aircraft.  The second archetype is the Split C2.  This model is often used by land forces 
when centralized C2 becomes too cumbersome due to the geographical separation of the 
units.  The Split C2 archetype allows for the addition of “tactical adjustments to new 
information by subordinate units” but can be criticized “since the delays inherent in the 
hierarchy may negate the benefits of centralized planning” in high operations tempos 
(Dekker, 2002, p. 5).  The Distributed C2 archetype places a high level of confidence in 
the personnel on the ground to make decisions based on the current conditions in a high-
Table 2 - Command & Control Archetypes, (Legradi 
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threat environment.  Dekker (2002) notes that this archetype is often employed by special 
operations units, and can also be seen in how most terrorist cells operate due to the 
continually changing circumstances in which they operate, where it is impractical to pass 
information up to decision-makers.  The final archetype is the Negotiated C2 archetype.  
This is often employed by emergency services personnel (fire and ambulance) when they 
are responsible for a fixed area, but may negotiate with units outside their area of 
responsibility (AOR) for assistance during a large scale emergency (Dekker, 2002). 
 Finally, Dekker doubles the number of archetypes (for a total of eight) by adding 
an additional variable to accommodate for information sharing, which allows units on the 
ground to pass information to all higher headquarters for information to be fused and 
redistributed again at the lower levels.  While this information sharing attribute does not 
change the sociograms of the archetypes in Table 2 above, Dekker recognizes it adds one 
additional “time step” to each of the archetypes for analyzing associated time delays from 
initial command to execution (2002, p. 9).  The addition of the information sharing 
attribute becomes exceptionally important when evaluating the Negotiated C2 
architecture, as it allows for units on the ground to negotiate directly with other units 
through “self-synchronization” setting the foundation for the emergence of Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) in military doctrine by maximizing a ground unit’s autonomy 
and capabilities (Dekker, 2002). 
 To test his archetypes, Dekker developed his own SNA methodology called 
“Force, Intelligence, Networking, and C2” or FINC (Dekker, 2002, p. 2).  Using a Java-
based application developed by the Electronics and Surveillance Research Laboratory of 
the Australian Department of Defence called CAVALIER, Dekker was able to input his 
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four archetypes into the program to see how each C2 archetype would respond to a 
specific scenario he developed by measuring the time-lag introduced by each C2 
archetype and measuring the number of “turns” required to complete the mission.  By 
incorporating attributes including intelligence quality, communication delays, and 
geographic area covered, Dekker was able to quantify four network measures, the 
information flow coefficient, the coordination coefficient, the intelligence coefficient, and 
intelligence volumes (Dekker, 2002, pp. 14-17).  The key point, as noted by Legradi 
(2009, p. 20) is “that once the network is discovered, quantifiable values can be assigned 
and the network can be analyzed and adapted to find better functioning networks to 
accomplish the mission”  thus setting a foundation for the validity of this research stream. 
 As a follow-on to Dekker’s (2002) research, Houghton, et al. (2006), from the 
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, chose to conduct an SNA applying 
Dekker’s archetypes to the C2 mission in emergency services operations, specifically 
focusing on police and fire services in the UK.  Houghton, et al.’s (2006) hypothesis 
stated that if an organization was structured contrary to the way the network naturally 
operated, a tension could develop leading to impaired team performance.   Additionally, 
due to the changing nature of organizations, whether from an increasing reliance on 
technology, the employment of larger geographical AORs, or any other myriad reasons, it 
is becoming clearer that traditional C2 structures of the past may no longer be the optimal 
C2 structures of today (Houghton, et al., 2006). 
 Houghton, et al. (2006) point out that with the increase in ease of information 
sharing over time, networks are, from an SNA perspective, becoming denser.  Increasing 
the density of networks has the potential to introduce both benefits and drawbacks.  One 
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benefit is that since most individuals are interconnected within a denser network, those 
individuals can more naturally create sub-teams as necessary to attack specific challenges 
(Houghton, et al., 2006).  Additionally, Houghton, et al. (2006) recognize that 
information will likely flow more quickly in dense networks, as the individuals rely less 
upon formal communication by employing informal methods instead.  As a drawback, a 
denser network has the potential to develop additional intermediate C2 elements resulting 
in greater information processing delays (Houghton, et al., 2006, p. 8). 
 To investigate their observations further, Houghton, et al. (2006) created a SNA 
of six emergency responses, three fire responses and three police responses respectively.  
The research of Houghton, et al. (2006) examined the tactical response level of the 
Incident Command Staff (ICS), specifically focusing on the communication between the 
Incident Commander (IC) and the different actors/organizations below the IC.   After 
developing the social network, Houghton, et al. (2006) assigned a relative importance 
value to each node and compared them using a sociometric and centrality index and 
identified the key players based on these calculations.  After identifying the key players 
in the response, Houghton, et al. (2006) then attempted to categorize each response into 
one of Dekker’s (2002) archetypes. 
 The findings of Houghton, et al. (2006) did not support Dekker’s assertion that 
emergency response networks modeled the negotiated C2 archetype.  Instead, Houghton, 
et al. (2006) observed that all the police networks demonstrated the split C2 architecture, 
two of the three fire response networks modeled the distributed C2 architecture and the 
final fire network modeled a slight modification to a centralized C2 architecture.   
However, Houghton et al.’s research validated that Dekker’s archetypes effectively apply 
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to the emergency management community and that many attributes can be quantified to 
conduct SNA to evaluate sociometric status and centrality. 
 Legradi’s 2009 research attempted to expand the research of Houghton et al. and 
Dekker by determining the similarities and differences of civilian and Air Force 
emergency response efforts.  Legradi (2009) chose to focus his research at the EOC level 
to better understand how social networks played a role in that level of response.  In order 
to accomplish his research, Legradi (2009) surveyed both civilian and Air Force ESF 
personnel to compare response characteristics between the two types of organizations.  
For the purpose of the survey, Legradi (2009) developed a Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) scenario happening just outside 
the gate of a fictional military installation.  Legradi (2009) left the scenario intentionally 
vague to allow for broad interpretation by the respondents of the survey.  Beyond simple 
demographic information, Legradi (2009) asked only two questions of the respondents 
based on the scenario.  Quoted below are the two survey questions Legradi used in his 
survey: 
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to 
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in 
order to exchange information, documents, schedules and other resources to get 
your job done [emphasis Legradi’s] (Legradi, 2009). 
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to 
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in 
order to seek inputs, advice and before making a key decision [emphasis 
Legradi’s] (Legradi, 2009). 
The scale referenced the respondents used to answer the questions used the 
descriptive words never, very rarely, rarely, occasionally, frequently and very frequently.  
With this information, Legradi (2009) was able to develop task and decision networks for 
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analysis and determine key attributes of both civilian and military EOC social networks 
including, a network closeness index (NCI), flow betweenness centrality (FBC), and a 
network flow betweenness index (NFBI).   Specifically, with these metrics, Legradi 
(2009) was able to mathematically identify distinct differences between military and 
civilian EOC networks.  In comparison of both NCI and FBC, Legradi determined that 
the civilian and military EOCs have “very few key players in common” which breaks 
from the expectation that in an identical emergency both organizations would respond 
similarly (Legradi, 2009).    This lack of similarity has the potential to “lead to confusion, 
time delays, duplication of efforts and a reduced level of performance” when both 
organizations are expected to work together in the joint environment (Legradi, 2009).  
These differences are particularly interesting due to the fact that since both EOCs are 
required to adopt the NRF, in theory both social networks “would handle the scenario in a 
similar manner” (Legradi, 2009).   However, in addition to these differences, Legradi 
(2009) observed that the centrality of both networks is very high, recognizing that ESF 
members are exceptionally good at interacting with other ESFs when they are required to 
make decisions or accomplish tasks. 
Because of the distinct differences in how the two organizations responded, 
Legradi recommended future research be applied to military EOCs to determine if 
performance could be improved by a new organizational structure.  Legradi speculated 
that the four main components of the ICS (Finance, Logistics, Operations and Plans) are 
likely present in the EOC and proposed that the ICS may be a strong starting point for 
research into a new organizational method for military EOCs. 
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Design Structure Matrices 
As another methodology of network theory, Design Structure Matrices (DSMs) 
span both operations and systems research and SNA.  DSMs are exceptionally powerful 
for modeling and analyzing complex organizations and processes.  “As a tool for system 
analysis, DSM provides a compact and clear representation of a complex system and a 
capture method for the interactions/interdependencies/interfaces between system 
elements (i.e. sub-systems and modules)” (DSMweb.org, 2009).  Eppinger and Browning 
highlight five advantages that DSM analysis offers in their book Design Structure Matrix 
Methods and Applications (2012).   
1. Conciseness 
2. Improved Visualization 
3. Easily Understood and Interpreted 
4. Powerful Analysis 
5. Flexibility 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012) 
 
Eppinger and Browning recognize the DSMs ability to provide substantial 
information of complex processes in a relatively small space.  “The DSM highlights 
relationship patterns of particular interest to a system designer” (Eppinger & Browning, 
2012).  Additionally, DSMs provide a system-level view which can support “globally 
optimal decision making and help orient those focused on particular elements” (Eppinger 
& Browning, 2012).  Furthermore, because DSMs are matrices, application of graph 
theory and matrix mathematics can be easily applied to the DSM to determine a number 
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of quantifiable characteristics of the system. Moreover, DSMs have the capability to be 
used and modified to fit the current system or scenario. Since the introduction of DSMs, 
“more than three decades ago, many researchers and practitioners have modified and 
extended the basic DSM with helpful graphics, colors, and additional data.  New 
possibilities continue to develop every year” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  Because 
emergency response is an inherently complex process of managing multitudes of people 
and resources, the DSM becomes a powerful tool to simplify and quantify the 
characteristics, responsibilities and tasks of emergency response. 
The DSM has its start in the product and systems architecture realm, and has since 
evolved over the years.  The first commonly used square matrix model designed to 
represent a system’s components was called the N-square diagram, first formally 
introduced to the academic community by R. J. Lano in his book titled A Technique for 
Software and Systems Design in 1979, however it is believed that various U.S. aerospace 
companies have employed the technique since as early as the 1950s or 1960s (Eppinger 
& Browning, 2012). While N-square diagrams are still used today, most notably as a tool 
incorporated in the U.S. Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF), the 
DSM itself was not introduced until 1994 when researchers at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology introduced the benefits of “distinguishing different types of interactions 
among components and of analyzing the model to prescribe alternative architectures with 
improved modularity” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). 
Three basic task relationships can be described by the DSM, the parallel 
configuration, the sequential configuration and the coupled configuration which can all 
be seen in Figure 3 below (Yassine, 2004).  An empty square in the DSM indicates tasks 
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can be completed simultaneously in parallel, while a single entry below the diagonal 
indicates the tasks must be accomplished in series.  Additionally, two entries on the 
DSM, one below and one above the diagonal indicate the tasks are coupled and must be 
accomplished simultaneously in a feedback loop in order for either task to be 
accomplished.  “The DSM provide insights about how to manage a complex project and 
highlights issues of information needs and requirements, task sequencing, and iterations” 
(DSMweb.org, 2009). 
 
Figure 3 - Three Configurations that Characterize a System (Yassine, 2004) 
 
     Product Architecture and Organization Architecture DSMs. 
Eppinger and Browning also identify four primary application types of the DSM.  
The four types are the Product Architecture DSM, Organization Architecture DSM, 
Process Architecture DSM, and the Multidomain Architecture DSM.  The Product 
Architecture DSM is “a mapping of the network of interactions between a product’s 
components” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).    Product Architecture DSMs have minor 
applicability to this research.  The second type of DSM is the Organization Architecture 
DSM.  The Organization Architecture DSM is a “mapping of the network of interactions 
among the people or units within an organization” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  This 
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DSM model is in many ways simply another method of visualizing and analyzing a social 
network.    While not specifically a DSM, Legradi’s (2009) survey research used similar 
techniques to the Organizational Architecture DSMs to calculate his SNA metrics. 
Organizational Architecture DSMs typically show three attributes of a social network, the 
hierarchical decomposition, the lines of authority, and the lateral relationships (primarily 
through information flow) (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  Product Architecture and 
Organization Architecture DSMs alike can use clustering to strengths of the dependencies 
of the components within the system. Usually clustering in an organizational architecture 
DSM, is to assign people with similar needs in such a way that promotes communication 
and team integration, while clustering in product architecture DSMs are used to group 
dependent features within a product together.   
     Process Architecture DSMs. 
The Process Architecture DSM is a “mapping of the network interactions among 
the activities in the process” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  In many ways, the Process 
Architecture DSM is a reformatting of more common process flow diagrams such as the 
Gantt chart or work flow diagram.  Eppinger and Browning paraphrase Eberhardt 
Rechtin’s book System Architecting:  Creating & Building Complex Systems (1991) by 
recognizing that: 
• Relationships among [activities] are what give [processes] their 
added value.  
• The greatest leverage in [process] architecting is at the interfaces. 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012) 
 
Because clustering simply doesn’t make sense in Process Architecture DSMs as it 
does in the previous two applications, the most common form of analysis of the Process 
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Architecture DSM is sequencing.  Sequencing is the process of logically ordering the 
activities based on the DSM inputs to determine the optimal progression of tasks and 
activities (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). While sequencing algorithms in many DSM 
software packages exist, they cannot be used outside the use of reason and critical 
thinking by those conducting the analysis.  It is typically an iterative process, as the 
software can only read what is on the DSM and cannot logically understand the activities 
behind the numbers.    
     Process Architecture DSM Applications. 
Process Architecture DSMs grew in popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with major enterprises such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) (Rogers, 1989), Boeing (Browning T. R., 2012) and General Motors (Black, 
Fine, & Sachs, 1990) adopting the technique for use within their organizations.  James L. 
Rogers, a researcher at the NASA Langley Research Center, recognized that within 
multidisciplinary organizations with “novel concepts, like large space platforms, the 
determination of the subsystems, interactions, and participating disciplines” cannot 
always be defined by previously well-established work practices (Rogers, 1989). As such, 
Rogers recommended an architecture design process (such as the DSM) to develop a 
“hierarchical structure before the planning documents and milestones of the project are 
set” (Rogers, 1989).   
As part of MIT’s 1997 Lean Aerospace Initiative, Boeing brought in a team of 
MIT researchers to document their processes in designing various unmanned combat 
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for the US military. Through detailed interviews with key 
stakeholders and follow-up surveys, the researchers were able to develop a process 
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architecture DSM of 26 conceptual and preliminary design phase steps and determine the 
interactions between each phase.  The owners of each design phase then provided the 
MIT researchers with estimated phase duration times and costs (optimistic, pessimistic 
and most likely), and likelihood of rework and rework impacts due to the inputs/actions 
of the other phases in the process.   The researchers then developed a model using the 
compiled matrices, and a Monte Carlo simulation which allowed the researchers the 
ability to create detailed process duration and cost estimates for the entire process.  Then 
through the use of sequence analysis the researchers were able to find the process order 
which resulted in the most optimized cost and duration estimates.  Because of the 
analysis, and due to Boeing’s priority to minimize process duration over cost, Boeing saw 
a 7% decrease in new UCAV project durations, but saw a slight increase in cost overruns 
(Browning T. R., 2012). 
Multidomain Architecture Models 
As DSMs have expanded and evolved over the years, a desire grew to develop a 
way to represent systems across multiple domains such as the product, process, and 
architecture discussed above, as such, the multidomain matrix (MDM) was developed.  
The MDM provides for the capability to link multiple DSMs together through the use of 
(typically) non-square Domain Mapping Matrices (DMMs) as can be seen in Figure 4 
below.  As an example, to link a Process Architecture DSM with an Organization 
Architecture DSM, a Process-Organization DMM can be used.  The Process-
Organization DMM would have the same number of rows as the Process Architecture 
DSM and the same number of columns as the Organization Architecture DSM.  The 
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Process-Organization DMM’s use would provide information on who in the organization 
is responsible for each task of the process DSM.  
Because DSMs across multiple domains can now be linked together the value of 
the DSM analysis increases exponentially.  Value can be created by “identifying needs 
for cross-functional, cross-team interactions in an organization based on interactions 
among product components or process activities” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  
Furthermore, MDMs can help infer interactions between domains where specific 
information may be lacking.  Additionally, MDMs can develop a more comprehensive 
plan for product or process architecting by incorporating more elements, to include tools 
and equipment, and strategic goals and objectives (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).  
Finally, by incorporating task duration estimates and costs across multiple domains, 
individual and team capacities can be estimated, and comprehensive cost analysis across 
every domain can be conducted.  
Figure 4 - Example of a DMM Linking Two DSMs Together.  Adapted from 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012) 
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FLOP and ESF DMM Construct Design 
While the ESF DMM construct is already defined by the 15 ESFs plus auxiliary 
EOC members, the FLOP construct required some development as there is currently no 
set organizational design to integrate the FLOP structure with the current Air Force 
organization at the EOC level.  By using the definitions of the FLOP functions as defined 
by FEMA, the Air Force organizational units fit relatively easily into each category. 
     Finance & Administration Cell. 
“Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses” (FEMA, 
2007).  The primary Air Force units in the finance and administration cell are: 
• Comptrollers 
• Contracting 
• Force Support Squadron 
     Logistics Cell. 
“Provides support, resources, and all other services needed to meet the operational 
objectives” (FEMA, 2007).  The primary Air Force units in the logistics cell include: 
• Civil Engineer Squadron 
• Communications Squadron 
• Force Support Squadron 
• Logistics Readiness Squadron 
• Maintenance Group 
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     Operations Cell. 
“Conducts tactical operations and directs all tactical resources” (FEMA, 2007).  
The primary Air Force units in the operations cell include: 
• Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Flight 
• Fire & Emergency Services Flight 
• Medical Group 
• Readiness & Emergency Management Flight  
• Security Forces Squadron 
• Shelter Management Team 
     Planning Cell. 
“Prepares and documents the Incident Action Plan, collects and evaluates 
information, maintains resource status and documentation” (FEMA, 2007).  The primary 
units in the planning cell include: 
• Judge Advocate General 
• Operational Weather Squadron 
• Readiness & Emergency Management Flight 
• Wing Chaplain 
 
While this is not an all inclusive list of every organization that could be required 
in an emergency response situation, it covers all those required to respond based off the 
CEMP 10-2 checklists for the eight scenarios researched.  Should other units or 
stakeholders be required to be integrated into the response, using the definitions of each 
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management cell should make it clear where the unit belongs.  Furthermore it is 
important to note that some units may fall to multiple cells.  For example the personnel 
management functions of the Force Support Squadron fall to the finance and 
administration cell while Force Support Squadron’s services-type functions fit best in the 
logistics cell.   
DSM Modeling 
The DSM simulation model developed by Browning, Dong, Yassine, and later 
updated by Mirshekarian “uses a discrete event simulation to compute the distributions of 
duration” for the given DSM inputs.  Each task in the DSM is assigned three task 
durations, a best case value (BCV), most likely value (MLV), and worst case value 
(WCV) which develops the vertices of a triangular probability distribution function 
(Browning & Eppinger, 2002) (Browning, Dong, Yassine, & Mirshekarian, 2000).  In 
addition to the DSM, two additional matrices are introduced as well to indicate the 
probability of rework for each given task, and the impact the rework would have on the 
entire system.  When the model is initially run, each task starts with 100% of the work 
yet to be accomplished.  The model then determines, based off the DSM inputs, what 
tasks can be accomplished and then subtracts the amount of work that can be 
accomplished based on the task duration and the assigned time-step interval.  The model 
continues by repeating itself, progressively accomplishing all tasks until no tasks remain.  
A single-run Gantt chart is then developed and the total process duration is recorded 
(Browning, Dong, Yassine, & Mirshekarian, 2000).   Because variability is introduced 
through both rework and task duration estimates, the simulation is run an assigned 
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number of times to develop a more comprehensively accurate process duration estimate 
through Monte Carlo simulation until running averages are stabilized around a certain 
value.  
Lean Value Principles 
As DSMs were gaining popularity within industry, MIT was also researching a 
new management philosophy based on Toyota’s product development system.  The 
philosophy, later coined as Lean Enterprise Value, “is [the] process of eliminating waste 
with the goal of creating value” (Murman, et al., 2002).  Lean Enterprise Value is based 
on five underlying principles, they are: 
• Principle 1 – Create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the 
right job. 
• Principle 2 – Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and 
constructing robust value propositions. 
• Principle 3 – Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise 
perspective. 
• Principle 4 – Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to 
increase lean value 
• Principle 5 – People, not just processes, effectuate lean value. (Murman, et 
al., 2002) 
DSMs become a tool that has application to analyze enterprises against many of these 
principles.  Murman, et al. recognized that: 
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More powerful methods are emerging based on the application of design structure 
matrices (DSMs) which provide a powerful visual and analytical tool to 
understand how the partitioning of work can affect not only the schedule but also 
the information flow throughout the program value stream (Murman, et al., 2002). 
Therefore, by incorporating process-organization DMMs, individual capacities can be 
calculated to analyze the overall level of effort each individual is required to expel in 
order to accomplish the objective.  Capacity is “the capability to complete tasks and 
usually refers to the volume of resources available for task realization” (Horman, 2001).  
In his paper, Modeling the Effects of Lean Capacity Strategies on Project Performance, 
Horman (2001) recognized that increasing personnel capacity as a means of eliminating 
waste and thus, increasing value, resulted in “yielding significant improvements to 
project time and cost performance” (Horman, 2001).  Horman further noted that through 
his simulations, the “capacity added to generate optimal performance is approximately 
80% of that originally provided to the project” (Horman, 2001).  Therefore, according to 
his research, optimal personnel management should seek to task their personnel as close 
to 80% of their capacity as possible. 
 Additionally, Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi (1997) recognized that flow is an integral 
component to optimal performance.  “Flow tends to occur when a person faces a clear set 
of goals that require appropriate responses. (Czikszentmihalyi, 1997)” An EOC is a prime 
example of where flow can occur because each individual is working towards a common 
and very clear objective.  This sense of flow in the EOC, has the potential to increase 
individual performance as each is attempting to meet the needs of those responding to the 
emergency.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the concepts of SNA and their application to the field of 
Emergency Management.  It discussed the application of DSMs in product, organization 
and process architectures, and discussed how they can be linked through the use of 
DMMs.  Finally, this chapter introduced the principles of Lean Enterprise Value, which 
become the foundation for research in optimizing organization, in particular Emergency 
Operations Centers through the use of capacity calculations.  The chapters ahead will 
outline the methodology adopted to evaluate performance between the ESF and FLOP 
constructs, the results of the analysis and the conclusions and applications generated from 
the research.    
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III. Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the method used for investigating the effectiveness of Air 
Force EOC organization.  This research will employ DSMs to independently evaluate the 
merits of both the ESF construct and FLOP construct for specific scenarios based on the 
required tasks outlined in the Air Force’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
10-2 (CEMP 10-2).  The DSM analysis will simulate the estimated time to complete the 
tasks outlined in the CEMP 10-2, and measure the individual capacities of EOC 
personnel under both organizational constructs. With this information, the best 
organizational structure can be determined, allowing the EOC director to tailor the EOC 
staffing based on the current scenario. 
Research Plan 
While many intermediate steps exist, the general strategy of this research 
simplifies to four basic steps.  Step one is data acquisition.  Process Architecture DSM 
analysis requires the specific tasks required to execute the project.  While emergencies 
inherently introduce uncertainty, the CEMP 10-2 checklist offers a near “comprehensive” 
list of tasks that can be expected every time a specific scenario occurs.  The second step 
is to input the tasks into the Process Architecture DSM.  To do this, the dependencies 
between tasks are identified to communicate which tasks can be run in parallel, series or 
through coupled iterations.  The third step is to augment the Process Architecture DSM 
with a Process-Organization DMM.  The CEMP 10-2 provides responsibility data for 
each task identified which is used to populate the Process-Organization DMM.  The final 
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step is to run the DSM/DMM simulation model to calculate the individual capacities, and 
use this information to assess the effectiveness of the two EOC organizational structures 
being evaluated. 
Data Requirements 
The key data requirement to conduct a DSM analysis is a comprehensive list of 
tasks or processes that are required to accomplish a given objective.  In the case of an 
EOC activation and response, this list is never fully complete, as responders could 
experience an infinite number of unknowns during any given scenario.  However, the 
CEMP 10-2 is a valuable document that lists the tasks likely to be accomplished every 
time a generalized scenario occurs rather than listing every possible task for every 
variation of a given scenario.  Therefore the checklists of the CEMP 10-2 offer the 
maximum level of detail available for planning purposes, thus providing the data required 
for the DSM analysis. 
Eight of twenty-eight checklists from the CEMP 10-2 were chosen based on their 
dissimilarities in regards to incident type and complexity, allowing for evaluation of the 
constructs through multiple criteria to determine what trends, if any can be identified.  
The eight scenarios are listed in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3 - CEMP 10-2 Scenario Checklists (United States Air Force, 2008) 
Checklist Incident Type Complexity 
Nuclear Weapons Accident Checklist Major 
Accident 
High (100 Tasks) 
Off-Base Aircraft Accident Checklist Major 
Accident 
High (76 Tasks) 
HAZMAT Response Checklist Major 
Accident 
High (73 Tasks) 
Response Task Force (RTF) Reception 
Checklist 
Major 
Accident 
Low (14 Tasks) 
Natural Disaster Checklist Natural 
Disaster 
High (96 Tasks) 
Disease Containment Checklist Natural 
Disaster 
Medium (45 Tasks) 
Peacetime Disaster Sheltering Natural 
Disaster 
Low (20 Tasks) 
Flood Checklist* Natural 
Disaster 
Low (15 Tasks) 
* The Flood Checklist is an augmenting checklist designed to be run in conjunction with the more 
generic Natural Disaster Checklist. 
DSM Model Construction 
With the eight scenarios selected, individual DSMs were constructed by 
identifying the interdependencies of the tasks identified in the checklists.  Understanding 
that the tasks of the CEMP 10-2 checklists are not necessarily listed in sequential order, 
and recognizing that mutually independent tasks can be accomplished simultaneously, it 
becomes relatively easy to identify which tasks are dependent upon one another, which 
tasks can be run in parallel and which must be run in series.  Once these dependencies are 
identified they are inputted into the DSM model. 
Simulation Characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter I, it is reasonable to assume that EOC tasks are 
information based, unlike actions occurring at the incident or event.  Because the tasks 
are based on information flows, the research assumes that task completion durations 
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remain fairly constant. Table 4 below shows the BCV, MLV, and WCV values and other 
characteristics used for this simulation.  The rework probabilities and impacts were 
placed at 5% because the work in the EOC during an actual emergency is relatively 
simple but with high-stakes, therefore the likelihood of task completion errors is 
relatively minimal.  Furthermore, to accommodate for maximum possible scenario 
variation, one-thousand simulation runs were accomplished to develop comprehensive 
process duration estimates.  As discussed in Chapter I, a five-minute time-step duration 
was used as a means to overcome the limitation of the maximum 256 time-step intervals 
allowed for in the simulation.    
Table 4 - DSM Simulation Characteristics 
Characteristic Value 
BCV, MLV, WCV 15min, 30min, 45min 
Rework Probability 5% 
Rework Impact 5% 
Simulation Runs 1000 
Time-step Duration 5 min 
 
DMM Model Augmentation 
Because the DSM can only develop an overall process duration, a second matrix 
is required to draw out individual personnel capacity based on the Gantt chart created by 
the DSM simulation.  As a means of evaluating individual EOC personnel capacity two 
DMMs were added to the simulation process.  For each run an ESF and a FLOP 
task/personnel matrix was matched against the single-run Gantt chart to calculate the time 
requirements of each individual for every DSM task.  To take into account the fact that in 
many cases multiple organizations have shared responsibilities for many of the identified 
tasks, three numerical estimates were used to indicate the relative level of responsibility.  
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Currently, no research exists on assigning values by relative level of responsibility, 
however preliminary simulation results indicated illogical capacities in positions such as 
the EOC Director (whose required capacities exceeded 300%), who stays apprised of the 
majority of tasks within the EOC.  Through testing, the following inputs brought the 
results back to reasonable capacities.  
• 1.0 – Those with primary responsibility 
• 0.5 – Those with secondary responsibility 
• 0.2 – Those with tertiary or minimal requirements to only stay apprised of 
task accomplishment 
  In all cases, at least one organization held primary responsibility for each 
individual task.  However, the 0.5 and 0.2 values were chosen as an assumption, as no 
prior research was found on this topic.  Further research could investigate the true amount 
of effort those with secondary and tertiary levels of responsibility typically expend to add 
further fidelity to the model.  Mathematically, these values show the relative percent the 
individual contributes based on the estimated task duration.  For example, a task that that 
is estimated to take 30 minutes calculates that those with primary responsibility spend 30 
minutes on the task, those with secondary responsibility will spend 15 minutes on the 
task, and finally those with tertiary responsibility only spend 6 minutes.  The DSM/DMM 
model ran 1000 iterations for each of the eight scenarios under both the ESF and the 
FLOP constructs, resulting in stabilized average time durations and percent capacity for 
the entire process and each individual.  
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 DMM Construct Design 
Chapter II discussed in detail the DMM development for use with the ESF and 
FLOP constructs.  The ESF construct was pre-defined by its current organizational 
structure, however, the FLOP structure was required to be developed based on FEMA’s 
ICS definitions for each of the four FLOP cells.  The following units fell to each of the 
four FLOP cells. 
     Finance & Administration Cell. 
• Comptrollers 
• Contracting 
• Force Support Squadron 
 
     Logistics Cell. 
• Civil Engineer Squadron 
• Communications Squadron 
• Force Support Squadron 
• Logistics Readiness Squadron 
• Maintenance Group 
 
     Operations Cell. 
• Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Flight 
• Fire & Emergency Services Flight 
• Medical Group 
• Readiness & Emergency Management Flight  
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• Security Forces Squadron 
• Shelter Management Team 
 
     Planning Cell. 
• Judge Advocate General 
• Operational Weather Squadron 
• Readiness & Emergency Management Flight 
• Wing Chaplain 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics, as the name implies, “are used to describe the basic features 
of the data in a study” (Trochim, 2006).  Univariate descriptive statistics examine data 
across one variable at a time.  In univariate analysis, the most common statistical tools 
used in descriptive statistics are the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation.  The 
mean is the most common averaging technique used to describe central tendency.  To 
calculate the mean all values are summed together and divided by the number of values.  
The median is the central most value.  The median is found by listing all values in 
numerical order and finding the value in the center; for example, if 5 values are used, the 
third value numerically is the median.  The mode describes the value that is most 
frequently occurring.  Finally, the standard deviation shows how much variation exists in 
the set of values by comparison to the mean.  A high standard deviation indicates high 
variability, while a low standard deviation indicates low variability (Trochim, 2006).  The 
research results of this thesis use both means and standard deviations to describe and 
evaluate the data in order to develop conclusions discussed in Chapter V. 
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Analytical Statistics and Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is an analytical statistical simulation technique “that 
approximates solutions to quantitative problems through statistical sampling” (Eckhardt, 
Ulam, & von Neumann, 1987).  Through use of probability distributions, and random 
number generation, a Monte Carlo simulation runs a scenario a large number of times 
each of which is equally likely to occur.  While each individual result provides little 
information for risk analysis, the aggregate of all the results provides a statistically valid 
probability distribution researchers can use to develop predictions (Eckhardt, Ulam, & 
von Neumann, 1987). 
Simulation Process 
The final output of the DSM/DMM model collected the overall process duration 
estimates for each of the 1000 runs and collected the overall amount of time each 
individual EOC member expended during the scenario’s duration.  The individual 
member’s time expended was summed across all tasks and then divided by the overall 
scenario duration to develop each individual’s percent capacity as seen in Equation 1 
below. 
 
(1) 
Equation 1 
Percent capacities were calculated for each of the ESFs, each of the FLOP 
positions, the EOC Manager, the EOC Director, and those positions required to respond, 
C
apacity 
=  
Individual Time Required 
Total Process Duration 
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but who are not included in one of the previous categories.  This data can then be used to 
directly compare between constructs to determine overall efficiency between the two 
organizational structures.  Results of the simulation will be discussed in depth in Chapter 
IV, Results while application and significance of the results will be discussed in Chapter 
V, Conclusion. 
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IV. Results 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the results from the research methodology discussed in 
Chapter III.  The DSM simulation model ran 1000 times and provided average process 
durations and standard deviations for each of the eight CEMP 10-2 checklists evaluated.  
Additionally, the model calculated individual capacities for both the ESF and FLOP 
constructs, providing a basis for quantitative comparison between the two organizational 
structures.  This chapter outlines and discusses the results of the DSM model simulation 
and provides the tabulated information below.  Furthermore, a figure has been provided 
at the end which evaluates average capacities between the two organizational structures 
for each of the eight scenarios, which provides a visual ability to compare the differences 
based on scenario complexity, and incident type. 
DSM Mean Process Durations 
Table 5 below lists the average process duration time as calculated by the 1000 
simulation runs of the Browning, Dong, Yassine, and Mirshekarian DSM simulation 
model.  These values are only model estimates designed for comparative research 
purposes, and therefore unreasonable to use them as an expectation for a real-world 
incident’s duration.   
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Table 5 - DSM Mean Process Duration Time (min) 
 
Natural 
Disaster 
HAZMAT 
Response 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Accident 
Disease 
Containment 
Off-Base 
Aircraft 
Accident 
Peacetime 
Disaster 
Sheltering 
Flood 
Checklist 
RTF 
Response 
Checklist 
Average 
Process 
Duration  
(min) 
721.14 633.55 872.36 470.57 909.71 248.64 240.29 269.68 
Process 
Duration 
Standard 
Deviation 
30.49 27.75 34.41 22.86 32.42 17.24 17.73 19.13 
 
Mean ESF Personnel Capacities 
Table 6 below displays the mean ESF personnel capacity.  These rates were 
calculated by summing the amount of time each individual ESF member spends on their 
assigned checklist tasks based on the ESF task assignment DMM and dividing by the 
overall process duration times from Table 5.   
Table 6 - Mean ESF Personnel Capacities 
 Natural Disaster 
HAZMAT 
Response 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Accident 
Disease 
Containment 
Off-Base 
Aircraft 
Accident 
Peacetime 
Disaster 
Sheltering 
Flood 
Response 
RTF 
Reception 
ESF 1 66.00% 39.74% 36.97% 23.03% 20.86% 0.00% 24.20% 34.68% 
ESF 2 57.26% 44.54% 29.83% 16.65% 20.85% 14.67% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 3 157.82% 30.01% 26.25% 47.33% 17.57% 41.91% 79.59% 69.04% 
ESF 4 97.51% 142.12% 118.59% 16.65% 54.40% 2.47% 26.43% 23.12% 
ESF 5 79.80% 152.67% 132.81% 15.38% 43.82% 136.91% 37.42% 23.12% 
ESF 6 84.23% 39.67% 33.40% 69.56% 29.11% 76.30% 15.29% 57.57% 
ESF 7 54.03% 30.01% 26.25% 23.01% 20.88% 39.05% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 8 120.43% 110.39% 151.80% 132.24% 63.59% 46.43% 15.29% 23.12% 
ESF 9 50.00% 30.01% 26.25% 14.09% 17.57% 0.00% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 10 50.00% 34.85% 26.25% 14.09% 17.57% 0.00% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 11 50.00% 30.01% 26.97% 14.09% 17.57% 0.00% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 12 50.00% 30.01% 26.25% 14.09% 17.57% 0.00% 15.29% 11.60% 
ESF 13 90.25% 90.94% 123.21% 58.83% 66.78% 29.30% 26.49% 23.12% 
ESF 14 50.00% 30.01% 26.25% 14.09% 17.57% 0.00% 13.06% 11.60% 
ESF 15 78.21% 59.19% 51.21% 31.25% 27.38% 36.67% 40.74% 11.60% 
ESF Average 75.70% 59.61% 57.49% 33.63% 30.21% 28.25% 24.68% 23.11% 
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Mean FLOP Personnel Capacities 
Mean FLOP capacities were calculated by the same method as the ESF capacities 
but using the results from the FLOP task assignment DMM. The results can be found in 
Table 7 below. 
Table 7 – Mean FLOP Personnel Capacities 
 
Natural 
Disaster 
HAZMAT 
Response 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Accident 
Disease 
Containment 
Peacetime 
Disaster 
Sheltering 
Off Base 
Aircraft 
Accident 
Flood 
Response 
RTF 
Reception 
FINANCE 57.21% 38.73% 29.85% 12.80% 0.00% 27.40% 13.06% 46.21% 
LOGISTICS 201.56% 48.41% 51.27% 92.66% 110.67% 34.00% 79.59% 91.90% 
OPERATIONS 127.72% 227.66% 244.76% 152.33% 85.77% 137.96% 35.40% 22.82% 
PLANS 101.60% 92.10% 61.93% 56.39% 61.00% 50.74% 62.76% 11.31% 
FLOP Average 122.02% 101.73% 96.95% 78.55% 64.36% 62.52% 47.70% 43.06% 
 
Mean ESF/FLOP Capacities Comparison 
Figure 5 below summarizes the mean ESF and FLOP capacities.   The figure is 
ordered by average percent capacities from highest to lowest for the ESF construct.  
Coloring was used to distinguish between incident type, browns for major accidents and 
blues for natural disasters.  Additionally, the use of dark and light color was used to show 
the variation in scenario complexity as described in Table 3 from Chapter III above.   
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Figure 5 - Comparison of Mean Capacities by Org. Structure 
Conclusion 
Results showed a significant increase in required capacities when transitioning 
from the ESF construct to the FLOP.  While in some cases, the average capacities 
significantly exceeded 100%, the majority of capacities under the FLOP were simply 
brought closer to the goal of 80% capacity as described by Horman’s (2001) research on 
lean capacity strategies described in Chapter II.  Chapter V will discuss these results in-
depth and offer conclusions and recommendations on the most effective staffing 
strategies based on the results of this research.  
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Figure 6 – Example Disease Containment DSM with FLOP Task Responsibility 
DMM 
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V. Conclusion 
Introduction 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate whether NIMS and the current AFIMS 
structure is the most effective method of organization, or whether while maintaining 
NIMS compliance, there may be a better organizational structure the Air Force could 
implement in the EOC.  To research this, two organizational structures were chosen, and 
were evaluated against the tasks of eight scenarios found in the CEMP 10-2 through use 
of DSMs.  This chapter will discuss the research results and outcomes of the analysis, 
provide conclusions and application of the results, and finally end by discussing 
recommendations for the future of this research stream.  
Generalized Research Application 
Before discussing the results of the analysis between ESF and FLOP, there was a 
more significant result that came through the development of this research.  This research 
developed a methodology that quantitatively compares multiple organizational structures 
based on a set of pre-defined tasks.  The methodology was augmented from the DSM 
analysis methodology to include a DMM which allowed for the quantitative analysis of 
each position in the organizational structure.  This DSM-DMM methodology provides 
quantitative evidence to managers and operates as a decision support tool to help in 
determining which organizational structure to use based on the tasks and durations 
required by the organization.  The following pages of this chapter will look specifically at 
the organization of Air Force EOCs as a practical example of the application of this 
methodology. 
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Capacity Results and Discussion 
Horman’s (2001) lean capacity research on project performance indicates that 
personnel tasked to approximately 80% of their overall capacity increase their 
performance by 10-15% (Horman, 2001).   Horman (2001) also noted that a decrease in 
performance is observed through simulations when capacity is decreased below 80% or 
increased above that value.  This is additionally confirmed by Jensen (1989) in his stress 
management research that indicates that “as the level of attention and motivation increase 
(and stress), so does performance.  However at very high levels of stress, panic ensues 
and performance deteriorates dramatically” (Jensen, 1989)  Based on these two 
observations, managers should strive to task their personnel to 80% of their capacity.  In 
relation to emergency response, due to the potential high stakes that can be experienced, 
EOC directors should seek to task their personnel up to 80%, but not exceed 80% to 
ensure stress and panic are appropriately managed. 
Results from the simulations were as expected.  There should be no surprise that 
by decreasing the number of positions in the EOC (from 15 ESFs plus auxiliary units to 
just the four FLOP positions), the required capacities will inherently increase.  What this 
quantitatively shows however, is that for seven of the eight scenarios examined, ESFs on 
average are reaching less than 60% capacity.  In fact most only reach 30% capacity or 
below.  However, FLOP capacity is significantly increased.  On the other hand, in some 
of the more demanding scenarios, particularly Natural Disasters and HAZMAT response, 
capacities exceed 100%, which is also problematic. 
Of the two main research conclusions, the simplest conclusion is that FLOP is 
best suited for less complex events, while the ESF construct is still optimal for the more 
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demanding scenarios.  However, a second solution can also be developed.  Because the 
organization of the ESF structure is inherently more compartmentalized by responsibility, 
tailoring the EOC staffing under the ESF construct is more risky for fear of losing 
specific emergency response and recovery capabilities.  However, under the FLOP 
construct, it would be generally assumed that work within the individual cells can span 
multiple units.  For example, the Logistics Cell leader under the FLOP construct would 
have ultimate responsibility for any logistical task whether it fell in a traditional logistics 
function or to another function such as public works.  Because of this expansion of 
authority under FLOP, personnel tailoring becomes possible as a method to overcome 
exceedingly high workloads.  Because tailoring under the FLOP construct is possible, the 
individual capacity rates from both the ESF and FLOP constructs can be used to develop 
an optimal EOC staffing plan based on the specific scenario.  Table 9, below, was 
developed using the capacity results of the DSM analysis and attempted to target a 
maximum 80% capacity through manning of the FLOP cells.  To accomplish this, the 
values found in Table 7 were divided by 80% and then rounded up to ensure no personnel 
were tasked greater than 80% of their required capacity to ensure those in the EOC were 
not subjected to panic.  Table 8 below indicates the minimum number of personnel 
required for each scenario type.  
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Table 8 - Personnel Required to Keep Capacities Below 80% 
 
Natural 
Disaster 
HAZMAT 
Response 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Accident 
Disease 
Containment 
Peacetime 
Disaster 
Sheltering 
Off Base 
Aircraft 
Accident 
Flood 
Response 
RTF 
Reception 
FINANCE 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
LOGISTICS 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 
OPERATIONS 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 
PLANS 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
 
In areas where specific expertise is required over typical response and recovery 
execution, exceptions were made to ensure the expertise was available in the EOC.  To 
determine which organization the personnel should be from, data from Table 6 were used 
because it indicated which organizations and positions were specifically relied upon 
during the response.  Table 9 compiles information from Tables 6, 7, and 8 to provide a 
recommendation for staffing based on the given scenario and can be used as a decision 
support tool to allow EOC Directors to activate only those needed for the given 
emergency. 
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Table 9 - EOC Staffing Decision Support Tool for EOC Directors 
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Chaplain P P   P P P  
Civil Engineer Squadron L L L L L L L L 
Communications Squadron L L L L L L L  
Comptroller Squadron F F   F F F F 
Contracting Squadron F F   F F F F 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal      O O  
Firefighting O O   O O O O 
Force Support Squadron L L L L L L  L 
Maintenance Group       L  
Medical Group O O O O O O O  
Operational Weather Squadron P P       
Readiness & Emergency Management O/P O/P O/P O/P O/P O/P O/P  
Security Forces Squadron O O O O O O O  
Intangible Benefits 
Beyond capacity, organizing the EOC based on the FLOP construct has many 
other non-quantifiable benefits as well.   Because responders on the scene are organized 
via the ICS which utilizes the FLOP construct, organizational mirroring has the potential 
to open the lines of communication wider than just the Incident Commander and EOC 
Director to each of the four FLOP chiefs as well.  By doing so, the workload (and 
therefore stress) of the incident commander can be significantly reduced, allowing him or 
her to focus on the response rather than communication with the EOC.  However, this 
mirroring also opens the door for a potential drawback of micro-management from the 
EOC now that the two entities are similarly aligned.  Additionally, by having an 
    
  
    
   
    
F – Finance & Administration Cell 
L – Logistics Cell 
O – Operations Cell 
P – Planning Cell 
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organizational structure that can be tailored to the given scenario, EOC directors can 
minimize the number of personnel that are activated during an emergency which lowers 
the number of those exposed to hazards during the unsafe period, and minimizes potential 
distractions from under-utilized personnel within the EOC.    Furthermore, because the 
FLOP construct is expandable, additional units that have only specialized use in the EOC 
can be easily incorporated within the FLOP without the need for creating new positions.  
This adoptive organizational capability has the potential to drastically improve 
emergency response effectiveness, reducing organizational redundancy and ambiguities, 
and potentially lowering exposure risk by minimizing those who need to respond to the 
EOC. 
Future Research & Applications 
While this research is a starting point for developing optimal staffing during an 
emergency response in the Air Force, there are also many areas where this research can 
be furthered and expanded upon.  First, this research operated under the assumption that 
the CEMP 10-2 was a comprehensive list of tasks.  Greater fidelity in the results could be 
attained by instead observing actual emergency responses, to gather specific tasks 
actually being accomplished in the EOC.  Furthermore, this would allow the capability to 
gather specific task durations for each event which would also increase result fidelity.  
Second, this research focused on eight scenario checklists within the Natural Disaster and 
Major Accident sections of the CEMP 10-2.  Research should be conducted on the FLOP 
construct’s applicability in the response of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, 
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Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Conventional Attack 
Actions.   
An additional stream of research can be focused through the use of surveys.  Both 
the ESF and the FLOP constructs can be analyzed, and an optimal EOC staffing structure 
could be developed through SNA survey results.  Complementary SNA research has the 
potential to confirm or refute the results of this thesis, and/or develop an entirely new 
optimal organizational structure for consideration.  Furthermore, it could be beneficial to 
conduct live exercises using both organizational constructs to achieve quantifiable 
evidence of the efficiencies of both organizational constructs. 
To expand upon this specific research, individual values for BCV, MLV, and 
WCV could be researched along with more precise values of rework and rework impact.  
Research into secondary and tertiary responsibility criteria, and the approximation of how 
much work these responsibilities impose could also improve accuracy of the results.  This 
has the potential to better predict the capacities, and develop a more precise decision 
support tool for EOC Directors.   
Additionally, the DSM methodology has a number of applications outside the 
field of emergency management.  It can be used, by itself or in concert with SNA on any 
task-based project or program with well defined tasks and personnel manning.  To 
maintain an Air Force Civil Engineer perspective, for example, research could be 
conducted on the primary tasks and functions of the Civil Engineer Operations Flight, or 
the Civil Engineer Squadron as a whole.  Furthermore, research could be narrowed to 
evaluate the efficiency of specific military construction (MILCON) projects, task by task 
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to better understand the organizational and project management functions of military 
construction.  
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Appendix A – Glossary of Terms 
AFIMS – Air Force Incident Management System - A methodology designed to 
incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS, the NRP and OSD guidance while 
preserving the unique military requirements of the expeditionary Air Force.  AFIMS 
provides the Air Force with an incident management system that is consistent with the 
single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management.  AFIMS provides the 
Air Force with the coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate 
its specific authorities into the collective framework of Federal departments and agencies 
for action to include mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
activities.  (USAF, 2007) 
BCV – Best Case Value 
C2 – Command & Control 
Capacity – “The capability to complete tasks… the volume of resources available for 
task realization” (Horman, 2001). 
CAT – Crisis Action Team – The strategic level of the AFIMS emergency response 
organizational structure chaired by the wing commander and staffed by the wing staff and 
group commanders. 
CEMP 10-2 – Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2 – provides 
comprehensive guidance for emergency response to physical threats resulting from major 
accidents, natural disasters, conventional attacks, terrorist attack, and CBRN attacks 
(United States Air Force, 2009). 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DMM – Domain Mapping Matrix – “A (typically) non-square matrix mapping othe 
domain of one DSM to the domain of another DSM.” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012) 
DSM – Design Structure Matrix – “A network modeling tool used to represent the 
elements comprising a system and their interactions, thereby highlighting the system’s 
architecture” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). 
EOC – Emergency Operations Center - The C2 support element that directs, monitors, 
and supports the installation’s actions before, during, and after an incident. (United States 
Air Force, 2009) 
ESF – Emergency Support Function - The ESF structure is a standardized 15 
organization structure grouping “federal resources and capabilities into functional areas 
that are most frequently needed in a national response” (FEMA, 2008)  Currently used as 
the primary organizational structure of the EOC.  A list of the 15 ESFs is found in Table 
1 found on page 6. 
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FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency - The Federal agency tasked to 
establish Federal policies for and coordinate civil defense and civil emergency planning, 
management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies. (United States 
Air Force, 2009) 
F - Finance & Adminstration Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure 
responsible for providing “accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses” 
(FEMA, 2007) 
FLOP – The organizational structure of the ICS.  It is an acronym for the four major 
functions of Finance and Administration, Logistics, Operations, and Plans. 
IC – Incident Commander – “The command function is directed by the IC, who is the 
person in charge at the incident and who must be fully qualified to manage the response. 
Major responsibilities for the IC include: performing command activities, such as 
establishing command; protecting life and property; controlling personnel and equipment 
resources; maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, as well as for task 
accomplishment; and establishing and maintaining an effective liaison with outside 
agencies and organizations, including the EOC when it is activated” (United States Air 
Force, 2009) 
ICS – Incident Command System – “ICS is the model tool for command, control, and 
coordination of a response and provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual 
agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting 
life, property, and the environment. ICS uses principles that have been proven to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in a business setting and applies the principles to emergency 
response” (United States Air Force, 2009). 
L - Logistics Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible for 
providing “support, resources, and all other services needed to meet the operational 
objectives” (FEMA, 2007). 
MDM – Multidomain Matrix – “An extension of the DSM modeling in which two or 
more DSM models in different domains are represented simultaneously.  Each single-
domain DSM is on the diagonal of the MDM and the off-diagonal blocks are DMMs” 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012) 
MLV – Most Likely Value 
NIMS – National Incident Management System - A system mandated by HSPD-5 that 
provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, and tribal 
governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively 
and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility 
among Federal, State, local, and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of 
concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multiagency 
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coordination systems; training; identification, and management of resources (including 
systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the 
collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. (United 
States Air Force, 2009) 
NRCC – National Response Coordination Center – “A multiagency center that 
coordinates the overall Federal support for major disasters and emergencies, including 
catastrophic incidents in support of operations at the regional-level” (FEMA, 2008) 
NRF – National Response Framework – “Presents the guiding principles that enable all 
response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and 
emergencies - from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe” (FEMA, 2008).  
O - Operations Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible for 
conducting “tactical operations and directs all tactical resources” (FEMA, 2007) 
P - Plans Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible who 
“prepares and documents the Incident Action Plan, collects and evaluates information, 
maintains resource status and documentation” (FEMA, 2007). 
SNA – Social Network Analysis - Social network analysis views social relationships in 
terms of network theory, consisting of nodes (representing individual actors within the 
network) and ties (which represent relationships between the individuals, such as 
friendship, kinship, organizational position, sexual relationships, etc.) (Knoke & Yang, 
2008) 
UCC – Unit Control Center – A secondary operational level response organization 
within AFIMS.  Each unit is required to have a unit control center to assist the EOC and 
IC during emergencies.  
WCV – Worst Case Value  
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